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Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries
of the Post-September I1 th "Pale of Law"
Daniel Kanstroom*
"The best criterion by which to decide whether someone has
been forced outside the pale of law is to ask if he would benefit by
committing a crime."'
I. Introduction
When Hannah Arendt wrote of being outside the "pale of law"
she was thinking about the terrible plight of stateless refugees in
Europe in the era before the Second World War. These days, many
different people find themselves in such rightless zones. Consider
the recent, remarkably similar statement of attorney Javier Nart,
following the decision of Spanish High Court Judge Baltasar
Garzon to prosecute his client, who had been held by the U.S.
military in Guantanamo: "In 32 years [as a lawyer] I never thought
I would have to be pleased that a client of mine was accused of a
serious offense ... he has also been converted into a human being
again. ' Such irony is not applicable only to "aliens" captured
outside U.S. territory. Ask U.S. citizens Jose Padilla and Yaser
Hamdi.3 However, the people who have long understood this irony
most thoroughly are non-citizens facing deportation from the
United States.
Prior to September 11 th, 2001 one could have said that some
legal categories were pretty clear. Immigration law was deemed to
. Clinical Professor and Director, Boston College Human Rights Program. Thanks
to Moira Smith and Sydney Urbach for research assistance.
I HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 286 (Harvest Books, 1973)
(1966).
2 See Judge Praised for Gitmo Effort, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD
/europe/02/14/spain.gitmo.reut (Feb. 14, 2004).
3 See Daniel Kanstroom, Three Lines, B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. (forthcoming
2004).
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be civil, not criminal law. Non-citizens who were subject to formal
criminal process retained the same rights as citizens.4 If, however,
they were placed in deportation proceedings, their rights were
much more restricted.5 The legal fallout from September 11h may
require serious re-thinking of such long-entrenched principles. The
reason for this is not only the so-called USA PATRIOT Act, to
which so much recent attention has been paid.6 It is also due in
large part to an increasing convergence between the criminal
justice and immigration control systems, part of a trend that has
been evident since the late 1980s.
This essay is a foray into deep and turbulent legal waters. My
general hypothesis is that well-accepted historical matrices are
increasingly inadequate to address the complex issues raised by
various U.S. government practices in the so-called "war on
terrorism." The essay describes certain stresses that have recently
built up on two major legal dichotomies: the citizen/non-citizen
and criminal/civil lines. It will do this, first, by reviewing the use
of the first of these dichotomies as part of the post-September 11th
enforcement regime. It will then move to consideration of the
increasing convergence between the immigration and criminal
justice systems, especially as it is exemplified by the proposed
CLEAR and HSEA Acts, which, among other things, seek to
criminalize unlawful presence in the United States.' These
exemplars seem to pull in different directions: in the first the
government benefits from the civil nature of deportation while in
the second it may lose that advantage. When viewed together,
however, one can see the potential emergence of a disturbing new
system which contains the worst features of both models and
maximizes prosecutorial discretion as it minimizes individual
rights.
II. Post-September 1 1 th Enforcement: The Citizen/Non-citizen
4 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235-37 (1896).
5 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893).
6 The full title of the USA PATRIOT Act is the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
7 CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003). See infra Sec. III. C.
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Line
All non-citizens in the United States are continuously subject
to a complex, ever-changing, relatively insular, flexible, and
highly discretionary legal regime called immigration law.
Immigration law, more than many other legal arenas, has long
been a highly categorical enterprise.8 It is filled with bright-line
dichotomies upon which cases turn and lives depend. Indeed, the
very definition of an immigration law case depends upon a
threshold categorization whether a person is a citizen or, as our
statute still refers to people: an "alien."9 More specifically, rights-
claims grounded in due process may also turn on whether a person
is categorized as a lawful permanent resident, a non-immigrant, or
undocumented. The basic constitutional rights available to a
person in removal proceedings hinge upon the categorization of
those proceeding as "civil."' Thus, in immigration/deportation
law, at least one major dichotomy is nested within another."
The citizen/non-citizen and criminal/civil lines have recently
been used on a massive, indeed unprecedented, scale. The federal
government had powerful tools for a response to the September
11th attacks that focused immediately on non-citizens. One month
8 Categorization is normatively neutral. Indeed, it is one of the defining attributes
of a coherent rule of law. It is helpful for all sorts of reasons - practical, theoretical, and
emotional - to know, more or less, where a particular issue "fits" in the grand scheme of
things. Boundaries are never perfect and slippage is, of course, inevitable over time as
many a Realist and critical legal theorist has noted. Acceptance of a basic categorical
method of thought does not necessarily stamp one as a wooden formalist. We need some
stable categories if we are to maintain any sense of continuity in our discourse. For
example, one might criticize the categorization of a particular matter as "civil" without
necessarily calling it "criminal," either. A more functional category of "punishment"
might serve as categorical bridge and, over time, could create a new category.
9 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) (2004). ("The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen
or national of the United States.")
10 See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1890
(2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Deportation and Social Control].
I I Indeed, other dichotomies have powerful effects, too. The very availability of
judicial habeas corpus review of immigration cases may depend upon whether an issue
is framed as one of law or discretion. See Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere: The
Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413 (2002) (hereinafter
Kanstroom, St. Cyr]; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut:
Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TuL. L. REv. 703, 731-34, 759-
66 [hereinafter Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut].
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after the attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft, made the
connection: "Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you
overstay your visa even by one day we will arrest you. If you
violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as
long as possible.' 2 The government focused its efforts on non-
citizens for obvious reasons: it was apparently easy and efficient,
and without immediate major political risk. 3  These aspects of
U.S. immigration law are among the most effective available
enforcement tools in the government's arsenal. The strongest
power is that of deportation of non-citizens and the concomitant
powers to arrest and incarcerate.
There are literally dozens of reasons why a non-citizen may be
deported from the United States.14 They range from non-
controversial grounds - such as terrorism - to the mind-numbingly
technical. 5 This complex system, which is the result of decades of
growth, gives immigration prosecutors great flexibility and
enormous power. Thus, as I often must warn my clients and my
students, almost any non-citizen can be deported at almost anytime
if an immigration agent wants to look closely enough at his or her
case.
Thousands of non-citizens, some completely innocent of any
wrongdoing, most others with minor immigration violations, have
felt the power of this zero-tolerance policy. For example, Tarek
Mohamed Fayad, an Egyptian dentist, came to the United States in
1998 as a student. 16 He was arrested on September 13, 2001, at a
gas station near his home in California. Four agents reportedly
ordered him to lie on the ground.'7 They told him that INS "thinks
12 Quoted in The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens
Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11
Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, June 2003 [hereinafter, June 2003 OIG Report]
at 12, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ special/0306/index.htm.
13 I write "apparently" because, to date, the strategy seems to have resulted in a
very small number of prosecutions or even leads.
14 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2004).
15 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2004)
(non-immigrant status violators); see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1227(3)(A) (2004) (failure to report change of address).
16 Testimony by Attorney Michael Boyle before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
(Dec. 2001) at http://www.aila.org.
17 See id.
[Vol. 29
CRIMINALIZING THE UNDOCUMENTED
you're illegal."'" They proceeded to search his home, seize his
passport and other papers, and to arrest him for alleged violation
of his student visa status. 9 Dr. Fayad was held in a Los Angeles
jail, and when friends tried to post bond, they were told that his
bond had been "rescinded."2 ° One of his friends was himself
detained and questioned for eight hours.21
Dr. Fayad was then transferred to Brooklyn, New York's high
security Metropolitan Detention Center. Guards called him a
terrorist. 22 At night, he was awakened every half hour. He was
held in the "Special Housing Unit," where he was in a cell 23
hours a day. He had no access to newspapers, television or radio.
23
It wasn't until the end of October that he was allowed to go
outside at 7 A.M. for an hour. His friends, family, attorney, and
the Egyptian Embassy could not locate him until November.24
Many other non-citizens in the United States tell similar
stories. Thousands have been held in detention, many for
technical, apparently pretextual, violations of civil immigration
laws.2 ' Detainees were subjected to a "hold until cleared by the
FBI" policy, which resulted in the average length of time from
arrest to clearance of eighty days, with considerable numbers of
people being held for more than six months.26 A government
report describes the case of, "[a] Muslim man in his 40s... [who]
was arrested after an acquaintance wrote a letter to law
enforcement officers stating that the man had made anti-American
statements... [that were] very general and did not involve threats
of violence or suggest any direct connection to terrorism. ' 27 This
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 The INS held some 762 persons in a scattered network of federal, local, private
detention facilities throughout the country. Their detention was a direct result of the so-
called PENTTBOM investigation, led by the FBI. June 2003 OIG Report, supra note 12,
at 1-2.
26 Id. at 46.
27 Id. at 64.
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man, according to the government report, was cleared of any
terrorist links. Still, he was held in detention for more than four
months before being deported.28
The way in which these round-ups and detentions were
conducted has also been subject to severe criticism. A report by
the Office of the Inspector General has cited dozens of recent
cases in which government employees were accused of serious
civil rights and civil liberties violations involving enforcement of
the USA PATRIOT Act.29 The report said that in the six-month
period that ended on June 15, 2003, the inspector general's office
had received thirty-four "credible" complaints of civil rights and
civil liberties violations by government employees, including
allegations that Muslim and Arab immigrants in federal detention
centers had been beaten. 30 "Credible" accusations had been made
against agents of the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA"), and the INS.31
Immigration law facilitates the surveillance, interrogation,
arrest, and detention of non-citizens. The government has much
more power in this setting than when it arrests of citizens, due to
loose standards as to pre-hearing detention32 and judicial review.33
28 Id.
29 Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act,
Office of the Inspector General (July 17, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/special/0307/index.htm.
30 Id. See Philip Shenon, Report on USA Patriot Act Alleges Civil Rights
Violations, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 2003, at Al.
31 Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act,
Office of the Inspector General (July 17, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/special/0307/index.htm. The Inspector General's report said that from December 16
through June 15, 1,073 complaints had been received, "suggesting a Patriot Act-related"
abuse of civil rights or civil liberties. Although hundreds of the accusations were
dismissed as "not credible or impossible to prove," 272 were determined to fall within
the Inspector General's jurisdiction, with thirty-four raising "credible Patriot Act
violations on their face." In the thirty-four cases ultimately deemed credible, the
accusations "ranged in seriousness from alleged beatings of immigration detainees to
B.O.P. Bureau of Prisons correctional officers allegedly verbally abusing inmates." Id.
32 See generally Kanstroom, Deportation and Social Control, supra note 10. As
the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, detention during deportation proceedings is "a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process." Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim,
538 U.S. 510, 539. See also, Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235 (stating that deportation
proceedings "would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the
inquiry into their true character").
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Therefore, it was not surprising that unusually forceful steps were
quickly taken pursuant to existing immigration law.34 Beginning in
the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the
detention of hundreds of non-citizens proceeded amidst near
complete secrecy as many detainees were held without access to
counsel.35 Removal hearings, historically open to the public, were
closed.3 6 Indeed, the Bush Administration publicly stated that
neither the location nor the identities of post September 1 1th
detainees would be disclosed.37
33 As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, detention during deportation
proceedings is a constitutionally legitimate feature of the deportation procedure. See
Kim, 538 U.S. at 541. See also Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235 (explaining that deportation
proceedings "would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the
inquiry into their true character.").
34 See generally Kanstroom, Deportation and Social Control, supra note 10. Less
than two weeks after the attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft also presented the
rather gracelessly named Mobilization Against Terrorism Act (MATA) to Congress.
The unfortunate association between this acronym and the Spanish verb matar (to kill)
was noted by many observers. Press Release, Attorney General John Ashcroft (Sept. 24,
2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/September/492ag.html.n17. Among other
provisions, the proposal sought to enhance the authority of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to arrest and remove alleged terrorists by expanding the
definition of terrorists to include those who provide support to terrorist organizations.
Id.
35 The Attorney General issued an internal memo on October 12, 2001, which
stipulated:
[W]hen you consider FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests and make a
decision to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be confident that the
Department of Justice will support your decisions unless they lack a sound legal
basis or provide an unnecessary risk of unfavorable impact on the ability of
other agencies to safeguard other valuable records.
See United States Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy: FOIA Post,
New Attorney General FO1A Memorandum Issued, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oip/foiapost/2001 foiapostl 9.htm.
36 See id. The Attorney General's memo instructed immigration judges to hold
certain hearings separately, to close these hearings to the public, and to avoid discussing
the case or otherwise disclosing any information about the case to anyone outside of the
immigration court. Indeed, judges were instructed not to confirm or deny whether such a
case was, or is, on the docket or scheduled for a hearing. Id.
37 On November 8, 2001, the Department of Justice announced it would no longer
release the number of detentions. Although the Justice Department had subsequently
released a list of the number of people charged with specific immigration violations and
their countries of origin, many questions about the post-September 11 detainees remain
unanswered, including the identities of all those detained, where they were held, etc.
2004]
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Throughout 2002, the INS and its successor within the
Department of Homeland Security, known as "ICE, 38 enforced
technical aspects of immigration law with highly focused zeal. The
"Absconder Apprehension Initiative" sought to locate 314,000
"absconders" from immigration proceedings, prioritizing young
men of particular national origin.39  As with all other such
initiatives, the absconder initiative has swept many innocent
people into the enforcement net.4°
Professor Anatoly Bogudlov, a retired astrophysicist from
Russia was reportedly "handcuffed, shackled, interrogated for nine
hours and then locked up for two days when he returned from a
recent trip to Moscow.'  His arrest was reportedly "based on
bureaucratic errors that had been buried for years" in INS files.42
Professor Bogudlov legally obtained a Green Card in 1996.43
However, his 1992 application for political asylum as a Soviet Jew
erroneously stayed on file, resulting in a 1999 hearing in Denver.'
Notice of the hearing was sent to the wrong address and when
Professor Bogudlov did not show up, the case was automatically
referred to an immigration judge who issued a "final order of
Hearings have also been veiled from public scrutiny. See Letter from U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs to Senator Russell D. Feingold (Nov. 16, 2001).
38 The acronym stands for "Immigration and Customs Enforcement."
39 Office of Deputy Attorney General, Subject: Guidance for Absconder
Apprehension Initiative (Jan. 25, 2002). On July 12, 2002, the INS stated that 758
persons were arrested as part of this program. See 79 Interpreter Releases 1044 (July 15,
2002). The period of stay for visitors to the United States was also shortened from its
prior 3-6 months to 30 days or a "fair and reasonable period" and most changes of status
from visitor to student were prohibited by a proposed regulation in April 2002. Limiting
the Period of Admissions for B Nonimmigrant Aliens, 67 Fed. Reg. 18065 (proposed
Apr. 12, 2002). See also 67 Fed. Reg. 71 at 18062 (prohibiting attendance in school
while change of status is sought). New security checks and reporting and fingerprinting
requirements for students were put into place in May 2002, and a plan authorizing the
Attorney General to order certain designated non-citizens to provide fingerprints,
photographs and other information was issued in June 2002. See id.
40 See Office of Deputy Attorney General, Subject: Guidance for Absconder
Apprehension Initiative (Jan. 25, 2002).
41 Nina Bernstein, Old Deportation Orders Leading To Many Injustices, Critics
Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2004, at B1.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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removal in absentia against him."45 His case is not unusual as two-
thirds of currently unenforced final removal orders were issued in
absentia, according to the government's own study of the issue.46
INS files were infested with incorrect addresses and other faulty
data which, when combined with years of backlog, resulted in a
chronic problem of notification of hearings and of removal
orders.47
The Administration has also developed new techniques of
immigration law enforcement. In November, 2001, the Attorney
General established a program of ostensibly voluntary interviews
of some 5,000 men who had entered the United States since
January 2000 from countries where Al Qaeda was said to have a
"terrorist presence or activity." In June 2002, the INS published a
proposed rule in the Federal Register entitled, Registration and
Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants.48 The proposed rule sought
to require certain non-immigrants to make specific reports to the
INS at various times of their visit: upon arrival; approximately
thirty days after arrival; every twelve months after arrival; upon
certain events, such as a change of address, employment, or
school; and at the time of departure from the United States.49
Affected people have been photographed and fingerprinted,
and also must submit to an interview concerning a variety of
topics such as opinions and associations. Indeed, one "Special
Registration Worksheet" reportedly prepared by the INS for
student visa-holders begins with two pages of rather innocuous
questions, such as: "What is your family (last) name? What is your
place of birth?" It then moves to more specific inquiries,
including, "What courses are you enrolled in? What are the names
of the class instructors? Are you currently enrolled in a full course
of study?" But, at the very end, come two rather chilling
questions: "What campus/social/religious/political groups are you
a member of or associated with?" and: "Are you associated with
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Registration and Monitoring of Certain Non-immigrants, 67 Fed. Reg.
40,581 (June 13, 2002).
49 The rule became final on August 12, 2002, effective September 11, 2002. 67
Fed. Reg. 52,584.
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
anyone who is potentially dangerous to the United States? 50
Failure to comply with the rule, or the discovery of
immigration violations while registering, could result in arrest,
detention, or deportation.5' The registration process, divided into
three distinct waves, ultimately has affected tens of thousands of
non-citizens within the United States. According to news reports,
hundreds of people were arrested or detained for suspected visa
violations by the INS when they attempted to comply with the rule
by registering during the first round.52 As a result, the second and
third deadlines drew much greater attention from the media and
human rights observers.53 It has been reported that some thirteen
thousand of the Arab and Muslim men who voluntarily came
forward to register with immigration authorities now face
deportation proceedings, though virtually none of them have been
linked to terrorism. 5
4
The USA PATRIOT Act 55 also used the citizen/non-citizen
distinction under immigration law.56 The Act authorizes the
50 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" as We Know It?:
Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1481 (2002).
51 The INS confirmed this practice in a subsequent memo, which stated that
"officers conducting these interviews may discover information which leads them to
suspect that specific aliens on the list are unlawfully present or in violation of their
immigration status." See Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, INS Executive
Associate Commissioner (Nov. 23, 2001). A Department of Justice (DOJ) report on the
initial round of interviews, dated February 26, 2002, stated that more than 2000 men on
the list were interviewed, approximately one percent of whom were found to be in
violation of immigration laws. Three men were arrested on criminal charges. Final
Report on Interview Project, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Director (Feb. 26, 2002). Despite
this rather low success rate, the DOJ announced that a second round of interviews of
some 3000 Arab/Muslim men would commence on March 20, 2002. Again, the
interviewees were selected, not because of any particular individualized suspicion but
apparently because of their nationality, ethnicity and religion. See generally Johnson,
supra note 50, at 1481-1511.
52 See Final Report on Interview Project, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Director (Feb. 26,
2002).
53 Id.
54 Diane Cardwell, Threats and Responses: The Immigrants; Muslims Face
Deportation, But Say U.S. Is Their Home, N.Y. TIMES (Foreign Desk), June 13, 2003, at
A22.
55 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT), Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
56 Id.
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Attorney General to incarcerate and detain non-citizens on the
basis of mere suspicion. 7 Title IV permits the detention of a non-
citizen if the government has "reasonable grounds to believe" that
the individual may be a threat to national security. 8 Such a person
may be held for seven days pending the commencement of
criminal or removal proceedings. 9
One more use of the citizen/non-citizen line deserves mention
here. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an executive
order authorizing the creation of military tribunals to try those
allegedly involved in international terrorism. The executive order,
unlike a similar order issued by President Roosevelt during the
Second World War, is expressly limited to certain non-citizens.6"
57 Id.
58 See id. § 412.
MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS; HABEAS
CORPUS; JUDICIAL REVIEW
SEC. 236A. (a) DETENTION OF TERRORIST ALIENS- (1) CUSTODY- The
Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is certified under
paragraph (3)...
(3) CERTIFICATION- The Attorney General may certify an alien under this
paragraph if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe that the
alien-
(A) is described in section 212(a)(3)(A)(i), 212(a)(3)(A)(iii), 212(a)(3)(B),
237(a)(4)(A)(i), 237(a)(4)(A)(iii), or 237(a)(4)(B); or
(B) is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the
United States. Id. (emphasis added).
59 See id. § 412:
(5) COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS- The Attorney General shall
place an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall
charge the alien with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the
commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence
is not satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien. The PATRIOT Act
also bars non-citizens from re-entry into the United States for certain types of
speech and organized activities that if engaged in by citizens, would likely be
deemed protected by the First Amendment. See id § 411. The Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, signed by the President on May
14, 2002, also deals with a range of post 9/11 security issues, including closer
monitoring of student visa entrants, and limits on visa-issuance to persons from
certain countries, designated as state sponsors of terrorism. Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543
(2002). See generally 79 Interpreter Releases 769 (May 20, 2002).
60 The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any individual who is not
a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine that:
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III. Category Slippage: Criminalization and the CLEAR and
HSEA Acts
"You don't shut down the borders. What you do is say we are
going to apply the criminal laws more harshly."
6 1
A. The Criminal/Civil Line
To reiterate: imagine a non-citizen about whom the
government has some suspicion. He might be arrested by USICE
as a suspected undocumented alien, an overstay, for failure to
report an address change, etc. This might occur pursuant to a tip,
during a workplace raid, or even on the street simply because he
"looks" undocumented to an agent. What rights will such a person
have? As to the arrest, his rights will be minimal. He will be very
unlikely to argue for suppression of evidence that may have been
seized in violation the Fourth Amendment.62 He will not be read
Miranda rights.63 Indeed, he may not even be advised that he has
the right to obtain a lawyer until after a government agent has
interrogated him. 4 He will never have the right to appointed
counsel.65 He will, of course, never have a right to a jury trial.66 At
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused,
threaten to cause or have as their aim to cause injury or adverse effects on the
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy...
... any individual subject to this order... shall ... forthwith be placed under
the control of the Secretary of Defense.
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
61 Lisa Zagaroli, Senators Use Rank to Set Pet Priorities: Achievements of
Immigrants Get Hearing From Senator Abraham, DETRorr NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at B5
(quoting Sen. Spencer Abraham).
62 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1984) (finding exclusionary rule
would not apply in civil deportation hearing).
63 United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d, 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Moody,
649 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1981); Babula v. I.N.S., 665 F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1981); see
8 U.S.C. § 1356(a)(1) (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1996).
64 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2004).
65 Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1292.2 (2004).
66 In re Kulle, 19 I&N Dec. 318, 319 (B.I.A. 1985).
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his hearing before the immigration judge, he may even find that
the burden of proof will be shifted to him, once the government
has made a showing of "alienage."67 And that showing may be as
minimal as a birth certificate from a foreign country with a name
on it that is similar to his.68 If he seeks an appeal of the
Immigration Judge's decision he may well face incarceration
during the length of that appeal - which could easily be years. He
may then receive a summary decision by a single member of the
Board of Immigration Appeals that is the product of ten minutes of
review of his case.69 If he seeks a further appeal to a federal court
he may well find that court declining review of "discretionary"
questions such as his potential eligibility for "relief' from
removal.7"
The key to all of this as a constitutional matter is the "civil"
nature of deportation proceedings, a categorization grounded in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States7 and accepted ever since. There is,
however, an obvious benefit to this categorization for the non-
citizen who wishes to accept removal: he generally will not face
formal criminal sanctions. This may be changing.
B. Convergence
There has been an increasing convergence between the
criminal justice and immigration control systems. Indeed, it
remains clear - as it has been for nearly a decade - that we live in
a time of extreme "vigor, efficiency, and strictness" as to
deportation of non-citizens convicted of crimes,72 due to nearly
67 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994); In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I&N Dec. 784 (B.I.A. 1999);
In re Castro, 16 I&N Dec. 81 (B.I.A. 1976).
68 In re Lugo-Guadiana, 12 I&N Dec. 726 (B.I.A. 1968).
69 See 67 Fed. Reg. 33 (proposed February 29, 2002) (relating to restructuring of
the B.I.A.). The Attorney General published a final rule in August, 2002 that is
substantially the same as the proposed regulation published in February. The B.I.A.
"reform" proposal instituted one-judge review, streamlined procedures, and reduction of
the Board itself to 11 members (from 21 positions). 67 Fed. Reg. 165 at 54877 (effective
September 26, 2002).
70 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2004); Mendez-Moranchel v. I.N.S., 338 F.3d
176, 176 (3d Cir. 2003); Mendes v. I.N.S., 197 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1999); Bernal-Vallejo
v. I.N.S., 195 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 1999).
71 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
72 See Kanstroom, Deportation and Social Control, supra note 10. In fiscal year
1999, the I.N.S. removed 180,101 non-citizens from the United States; 69, 409 of the
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two decades of sustained attention to this issue. We continue to
reap the bitter harvest of two exceptionally harsh laws: the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)73 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).74 Deportation is now often a
virtually automatic consequence of a non-citizen's criminal
conviction for even a minor state misdemeanor.75
This convergence, supported by those who seek more
expeditious deportation of non-citizen criminals,76 has been the
removals were due to criminal convictions. In fiscal year 1998, the INS removed
172,887 non-citizens; 60,479 of the removals were due to criminal convictions. In fiscal
year 1997, the INS removed 114,432 non-citizens; 3,214 of the removals were due to
criminal convictions. 1999 IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE STAT. Y.B., 23,
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/enf99.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2004). During the past few years, an array of initiatives has been developed to
facilitate and to speed such deportations. These programs have included the so-called
Institutional Hearing Programs, through which final orders of deportation are secured
while non-citizens serve their criminal sentences; the "State Criminal Alien Assistance
Program," which was authorized by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and
which provides reimbursement to the states for the cost of incarcerating certain non-
citizens convicted of crimes; streamlined administrative deportation processes for certain
aggravated felons; authority for U.S. District Court judges to order deportation at the
time of sentencing, with INS consent; the so-called "Criminal Alien Identification
Programs," which seek to identify and to remove previously deported criminal non-
citizens; and a wide variety of strike forces, task forces, and state and local initiatives.
See generally Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 4-15 (1995)
(statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization
Service); Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 373 n.24 (1999) (noting that
"including IIRIRA, ten laws since 1986 have included significant measures affecting
criminal aliens").
73 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
74 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of
8 and 18 U.S.C.). Among many other provisions, these laws sought to eliminate judicial
review of certain types of criminal deportation (removal) orders, dramatically and
retroactively expanded many grounds of inadmissibility and deportation, eliminated
some and limited other discretionary waivers of deportability, developed a system of
mandatory detention for many classes of non-citizens, created expedited removal
procedures for certain types of cases, and authorized vastly increased state and local law
enforcement involvement with immigration matters.
75 See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43).
76 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (1996); United States v. Rangel de Aguilar, 308 F.3d 1134,
1137-38 (10th Cir. 2002).
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subject of widespread critique. For one thing, as Margaret Taylor
and Ronald F. Wright have explained it:
Neither of these bureaucracies wins plaudits for its efficiency or
its humane treatment of the people caught up in the cases. One
system is profoundly troubled; the other is a disaster. Criminal
defense lawyers and immigration attorneys might disagree about
which system deserves which label.77
Beyond the well-known flaws inherent in each system, and the
unlikelihood that two wrongs can either make or protect a right,
the combination of the two has not resulted in much apparent
gain."
Convergence takes place in two different ways, however, and
both challenge the criminal/civil dichotomy. First, as noted, some
unfortunate non-citizens are subject to state or federal criminal
prosecution for "regular" (i.e., non-immigration-related) offenses,
such as drug crimes. After the criminal justice system has
completed its work, the removal system begins. It is in this
venerable setting79  that problems of inefficiency, lack of
coordination, and resource duplication are most acute. The
numbers are not small. In 2001 the federal government prosecuted
some seventy-five thousand offenders, of whom some thirty-three
percent were non-citizens. State systems also prosecute many
millions of cases, but the citizen/non-citizen breakdown is not
definitively calculated.8 ° We do know, however, that tens of
thousands of people are deported each year due to criminal
77 Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1131 (2002).
78 See id. ("However badly these two systems operate by themselves, they work
even more poorly when they are haphazardly combined. The two systems duplicate
many tasks, gathering many of the same facts about the non-citizen and employing two
distinct sets of investigators and judges.").
79 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
80 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online Tbl.5.21 (Kathleen Maguire &
Ann L. Pastore eds.) (75,650 federal defendants in 2001), at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/1995/pdf/t521.pdf; see also U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sourcebook of
Federal Sentencing Statistics Thl.9 (2001), at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/
table9.pdf; Nora V. Demleitner & Jon M. Sands, Non-citizen Offenders and Immigration
Crimes: New Challenges in the Federal System, 14 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 247 (2002);
Marc L. Miller, The 2002 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Immigration Law:
Assessing New Immigration Enforcement Strategies And The Criminalization Of
Migration: Introduction, 51 EMORY L.J. 963 (2002).
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convictions, many of which took place in state courts.8'
Cases of this type may also raise claims of double punishment.
Indeed, there is both illogic and injustice deeply ingrained in this
system. As a matter of basic criminal law theory, deportation of
non-citizens, particularly of long-term lawful permanent
residents for post-entry criminal conduct is punishment.8 2 Thus,
strong arguments can be made that persons subject to these types
of removal proceedings deserve the basic constitutional rights
accorded to criminal defendants.83 This argument is buttressed by
the facts that the proceedings are initiated by a government
enforcement agency, are directly based on criminal conduct,
involve incarceration and forced movement of persons, and may
result in lifetime banishment.84 Still, that is not the law of the
United States.85
There is also another type of convergence: the criminalization
of "civil" immigration law violations. If, as I have argued,
removal is a more flexible and efficient enforcement tool, one
might well ask why the federal government would bother to
criminalize immigration law violations? The obvious reason was
to provide a stronger potential sanction. Thus, in the late
nineteenth century, a Chinese deportee could be sentenced to a
year at hard labor for violating immigration laws. Then he would
be deported. 86 Another reason is that certain types of immigration
law violations seem more logically to implicate the criminal law.
Document fraud and smuggling people across the border seem to
81 Also, between 1984 and 1994, the number of non-citizens serving a sentence of
imprisonment in a federal prison increased an average of 15% annually from 4,088 to
18,929; the overall federal prison population, by contrast, increased an average 10%
annually from 31,105 to 87,437. Fifty-five percent of the non-citizens prosecuted in
Federal court during 1994 were in the United States legally. U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm.
82 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 733 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that deportation is punishment).
83 Id.
84 See Kanstroom, Deportation and Social Control, supra, note 10.
85 See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 883 F. Supp.
1365, (9th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hile the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave,
they are not imposed as a punishment.").
86 See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237-38.
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fit well in this category.
The total number of prosecutions for immigration offenses has
risen dramatically in the past decade from 14,854 in 1994 to
23,852 in 2002. The "referral rate" on such cases is also unusually
high compared to non-immigration related crimes. Of the 118,978
suspects in all criminal matters concluded during 2001, 73% were
referred for prosecution either before a U.S. district court judge
(61%) or a U.S. magistrate (12%). Nearly all (97%) of those
investigated for immigration offenses were referred for
prosecution.88 The number of convictions has also increased, from
10,210 in 1994 to 21,044 in 2002, largely as a result of many
fewer dismissals.89 Statistically, the most dramatic increase has
been convictions for illegal re-entry - 803 in 1994 to 4,696 in
2002.90 There has also been an increased use of the criminal
justice system against asylum-seekers - a practice that seems
especially harsh and mean-spirited to many, as well as a possible
violation of international human rights law. Nevertheless, the U.S.
Attorney offices in Miami and elsewhere have prosecuted some
asylum-seekers for arriving in the United States with false
documents. 9'
87 Some immigration law violations, such as entry without inspection, have long
been criminal. 8 U.S.C. §1325(a) (2004); See also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B) (2004)
(authorizing criminal prosecution against an alien with a final removal order who
"willfully fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other
documents necessary to the alien's departure"); 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2004) (criminal
penalties for reentry into the country by an alien previously convicted of a felony); 8
U.S.C. § 1306 (2004) (offenses relating to registration of aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)
(2004) (transporting illegal aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2004) (engaging in a pattern or
practice of hiring illegal aliens). The INA also provides that violations of some
provisions are punishable by civil penalties. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (2004)
(failure to depart voluntarily after agreeing to do so); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(c) (2004)
(penalties relating to vessels and aircraft).
88 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2002, pp. 470-71 at http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t577.pdf.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See Donald Kerwin, Counterterrorism and Immigrant Rights Two Years Later,
80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 39, Oct. 13, 2003, at 1403 (citing letter from Wendy Young
to John Ashcroft). See also United States of America v. Abdelhafid Bradaiaka
Guillanumie Granier, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3085 (MN 2004) (Defendant's Motion for
Revocation of Detention Order granted but defendant, an asylum-seeker, still faces three-
count indictment, for using and attempting to use a false, forged, altered, and
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C. Linking Crime, Immigration Control, and the "War on
Terror". CLEAR and HSEA
The convergence between immigration control and criminal
prosecution will receive a major boost if two pending bills, the so-
called CLEAR Act and Homeland Security Enforcement Act, 92 are
enacted into law. These bills could cause some doctrinal upheaval
by their criminalization of mere presence in the United States. 93
On July 9, 2003, Representative Charles Norwood, a Georgia
Republican, introduced the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal
Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act, H.R. 2671. The CLEAR Act, in
brief, would:
(1) authorize state and local law enforcement personnel to
investigate, arrest, detain, and participate in the removal of non-
citizens in the United States;
(2) provide that a State that does not have a statute permitting
enforcement of Federal immigration laws within two years of
enactment of this Act shall not receive certain Federal
incarceration assistance;
(3) amend the Immigration and Nationality Act with respect to
"illegal aliens" to:
(a) establish criminal penalties and forfeiture for aliens
unlawfully present in the United States;
(b) increase specified criminal and civil penalties for illegal
entry and failure to depart violations; and
(c) direct the Attorney General to make grants to local
police agencies for equipment and facilities related to
housing and processing illegal aliens; 95
counterfeited passport, or instrument purporting to be a passport, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1543; using a false entry document in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1546(a) (1st
para.) (2004); and presenting an immigration document containing a false statement in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (4th para.) (2004). The charges in the indictment
resulted from the Defendant's attempt to enter the United States with a false passport on
January 17, 1999.)
92 HSEA Act, S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003); see infra Part III.
93 CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003); see also HSEA, S. 1906, 108th
Cong. (2003).
94 See CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).
95 The CLEAR Act also would: provide for payment of funds from certain civil
penalties to State and local law enforcement agencies for apprehension of such non-
citizens; require States and localities to provide the Department of Homeland Security
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4) provide for the listing of immigration violators in the
National Crime Information Center database;
(5) amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for
Federal custody and State or local compensation of State or
locally apprehended illegal aliens.
In short, the law would seek to resolve any lingering legal
doubts about state authority to enforce federal immigration laws
by making Congressional authorization explicit. It would also
effect a nearly complete merger between the criminal and civil
immigration control systems due to its criminalization of mere
presence in the United States, a status-based crime that would
apparently continue indefinitely.
In November of 2003, Senators Jeff Sessions (R-AL), and Zell
Miller (D-GA) introduced a largely identical measure (the
Homeland Security Enhancement Act, S. 1906 [HSEA]). 96 The
major difference is that the CLEAR Act seeks to require state and
local law authorities to enforce federal immigration with the threat
of withholding federal funds if they decline. The HSEA would
simply deny funding to states and localities that have in place
practices or policies against such enforcement. Neither bill
requires training in immigration law for the state and local police.
Some of the arguments in favor of these laws seem
compelling. Senator Sessions advocates a "culture of cooperation"
among federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities as to
with specified information about apprehended "illegal aliens"; and eliminate certain
Federal incarceration assistance for noncompliance. See CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108th
Cong. (2003).
96 HSEA, S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003). The Senate bill also states that the
Department of Homeland Security shall continue to operate the Institutional Removal
Program, which shall be expanded to all States. It further amends the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to prohibit a Federal agency from
accepting for any identification-related purpose a State driver's license unless, if the
driver's license is issued to an alien who is in lawful status but who is not an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, the license expires on the date on which the
alien's U.S. residency authorization expires. Finally, it states that in the issuance of any
Federal public benefit that requires recipient identification, no Federal entity may accept
any identification document unless: (1) the document was issued by a Federal or State
authority and is subject to verification by a Federal law enforcement, intelligence, or
homeland security agency; or (2) the recipient is lawfully present in the United States, is
in possession of a passport; and is a citizen of a country for which the visa requirement
for U.S. entry is waived if the alien possesses a passport from such country. See id.
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
immigration matters.97 He suggests, not implausibly if a bit
excitedly, that
[i]n the world of immigration laws, a facade of enforcement that
holds no real consequences for law breakers is both dangerous
and irresponsible. If the only real consequence of coming to this
country illegally is a social label, then our immigration laws are
but a brightly painted sepulcher full of dead bones, for it is
impossible to be a Nation governed by the rule of law, if our
laws have no real effect on the lives of the people they govern.
98
What is most intriguing about Senator Sessions's statement,
however, is its linkage of crime control, immigration control, and
September 11th. Thus, after describing large number of "illegal
aliens" in the United States, a link to September 1 1th provides the
coup de grace for Senator Sessions:
The next number is perhaps the most concerning - 3,000 of the
'alien absconders' within our borders are from one of the
countries that the State Department has designated to be a 'state
sponsor of terrorism.' 99
Representative Norwood began a public statement °0 in support
of the CLEAR Act with a rather terrifying vignette:
Miguel Angelo Gordoba is a child molester and illegally in our
country. In August 2001, he finished a four-year sentence at
Rivers State Prison for molesting a 2-year old girl in Alma,
Georgia. On the day he finished his sentence you would think he
would be picked up and deported. As unbelievable as it sounds,
97 149 CONG. REc. S 15293 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
98 Id. These somewhat abstract arguments are buttressed by some contestable, but
roughly accurate statistics:
The lack of immigration enforcement in our country's interior has resulted in 8-
10 million illegal aliens living in the U.S. with another estimated 800,000 illegal
aliens joining them every year-that is on top of the more than 1 million that
legally immigrate each year.... [T]he Department of Homeland Security has
estimated that 450,000 are 'alien absconders' people that have been issued final
deportation orders but have not shown up for their hearings.... An estimated
86,000 of them are criminal illegal aliens people convicted of crimes they
committed in the U.S. who should have been deported, but have slipped through
the cracks and are still here.
99 Id.
100 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 82 (2003) (statement of Rep. Charles
W. Norwood, Sponsor, H.R. 2671).
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the INS, now the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, didn't have his paperwork done. Subsequently,
Mr. Gordoba registered as a sex offender, but when the county
sheriff went to the listed address to check in on him, all he found
was a vacant lot.
In addition to roving alien child molesters, Representative
Norwood, like Senator Sessions, then also alleges an additional
number of "those people with final deportation orders are from
countries with a known Al-Qaeda presence." (His total, however,
is 3,800). °10 Against this public threat, Representative Norwood
sees an undermanned protective force:
[T]here is no way the 2,000 agents they have assigned to find
some 400,000 people can get the job done. They need help from
the folks who come across these people everyday during routine
traffic stops and during other activities in the course of their
regular duty police officers ....
Opponents of these proposals, though lacking equally
compelling horror stories, have also grappled with the law
enforcement issues. Thus, the National Immigration Forum
suggests:
Not only will this shift in priorities mean local police have less
time for their main missions (crime-solving and prevention), but
it will actually make their job much harder. Experience tells
them that when immigrants begin to see local police as agents of
the federal government, with the power to deport them or their
family members, they are less likely to approach local law
enforcement with tips on crimes or suspicious activity... No
police officer wants to know that criminals are on the loose
simply because their victims are afraid to speak up and report
the crimes. 1
03
Indeed, some law enforcement officers," such as Arlington,
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The CLEAR Act and Its Senate Counterpart, The National Immigration Forum,
at http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/clear.htm.
104 Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) notes
that:
Local law enforcement officials from across the country - including the
California Police Chiefs Association, the Federal Hispanic Law Enforcement
Officers Association (FHLEOA), Chief Charles H. Ramsey of the Metropolitan
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Texas, Police Chief Theron Bowman, have been particularly
piquant in their opposition to these initiatives:
We can't and won't throw our scarce resources at
quasi-political, vaguely criminal, constitutionally
questionable, nor any other evolving issues or
unfunded mandates that aren't high priorities with
our citizenry . . . .Our policing authority and
professional mission is derived from the citizens.' °5
Others have noted the potential problems raised by delegation
of authority to enforce complex federal laws to state and local
police. °6 The American Immigration Lawyers Association notes
that "[f]ederal immigration law is an extremely complicated body
of law that requires extensive training and expertise to understand
and properly enforce."'0 7  Some have also pointed out that the
criminalization of the undocumented could violate international
law regarding the rights of asylum-seekers.1"8
The proposed CLEAR and HSEA Acts exemplify tectonic
frictions on the criminal/civil and citizen/non-citizen lines. These
proposals could result in a massive enlargement of federal
enforcement capacities and the criminalization of millions of
people. They ought to be taken very seriously.
The proposals highlight the need for more thorough
consideration of the confusion engendered by a government that
desires to be: open to immigration, tough on "criminal aliens,"
tough on immigration law violators, and engaged in a "war" on
terrorism against, for the most part, foreign enemies. In light of
those complex desider-ata, we ought to wonder about the wisdom
Washington Police Department and the chief of police in Arlington, Texas -
have publicly voiced their opposition to the federal government's efforts to
conscript local police officers in the enforcement of federal immigration law.
Human Rights First, Our New Federalism: Broad Based Concern About Local Law
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
us law/us lawl6.htm.
105 Jennifer Emily, Two Chiefs Oppose Immigration Role, DALLAS MoRN. NEWS,
Apr. 5, 2002, at 27A.
106 See Patricia Lee Refo, CLEAR Report, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. REP., available
at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/documents/clear/CLEARReport.doc.
107 American Immigration Lawyers Association, State and Local Enforcement of
Federal Immigration Law, at http://www.aila.org.
108 Refo, supra note 106.
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of a law that would criminalize millions of people, many of whom
have been living among us as otherwise law-abiding members of
the community for many years. Moreover, the empowerment of
state and local police to enforce such federal criminal laws
portends a highly intrusive system that could easily affect many
citizens too. Also, a major potential irony of the CLEAR and
HSEA Acts should now be apparent: a non-citizen prosecuted for
the new crime of "unlawful presence" will have vastly more
procedural rights than one who is simply placed in removal
proceedings. °9 Thus, Hannah Arendt's observation about the "pale
of law" could well be played out in local police stations and courts
throughout the country, as potential defendants might oddly seek
to be prosecuted in order to obtain appointed counsel and other
constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants.
D. Undocumented Workers as Permanent Criminals?
Of course, the proponents of the CLEAR and HSEA Acts are
not motivated by a desire to grant more rights to the
undocumented. "O They want to get tough. They also may want to
resolve an ambiguity illustrated by an exchange that took place at
the Supreme Court nearly twenty years ago. Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,"' stated that
one of the respondents, Sandoval-Sanchez, was a criminal:
"Sandoval-Sanchez is a person whose unregistered presence in this
country, without more, constitutes a crime.""' 2 If one considers this
statement in its simplest sense: that "unregistered" or unlawful
presence in the United States is a crime, it was - and remains -
plainly wrong." 3 Nor did the Sandoval's failure to register
109 Id.
110 See Arendt, supra note 1, at 286
''' 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
112 468 U.S. at 1047.
113 Indeed, Justice O'Connor's footnote admits as much:
Sandoval-Sanchez was arrested on June 23, 1977. His deportation hearing was
held on October 7, 1977. By that time he was under a duty to apply for
registration as an alien. A failure to do so plainly constituted a continuing crime.
8 U. S. C. §§ 1302, 1306. Sandoval-Sanchez was also not prosecuted for his
initial illegal entry into this country, an independent crime under 8 U. S. C. §
1325. We need not decide whether or not remaining in this country following an
illegal entry is a continuing or a completed crime under § 1325....
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necessarily render him subject to criminal sanction.'14 Failure to
register is not a strict liability offense." 5 Indeed, the statute that
makes it a crime not to register is entitled, "Willful failure to
register.""l 6 It states in relevant part that "[a]ny alien required to
apply for registration and to be fingerprinted in the United States
who willfully fails or refuses to make such application.., shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."
It is true that INA Sec. 1326, which criminalizes re-entry after
deportation, has been considered to describe a continuing offense.
As the Ninth Circuit put it in United States v. Ruelas-Arreguin: "'
Under § 1326, a deported alien may be convicted for either
entering, attempting to enter, or being "found in" the United
States. They are three distinct offenses. ... The crime of being
"found in" the United States is completed when the "alien is
discovered and identified by the immigration authorities."
However, the crime does not begin and end there.
An "entry" into the United States is required before a person is
"found in" the United States . . . .Thus, the crime of being
"found in" the United States commences with the illegal entry,
but is not completed until discovery. In that sense, we have held
that it is a "continuing offense," even though the crime does not
crystallize until official discovery and identification. To
paraphrase T.S. Elliot, the crime's beginning is in its end, and its
end in its beginning. 18
But 8 U.S.C. § 1325, which criminalizes any improper entry,
has not been so construed to date." 9 Thus, many current
undocumented people in the United States might well be outside
the federal statute of limitations for such prosecution. 20 Again, it
Justice O'Connor also noted that "[t]he question is academic, of course, since in
either event the unlawful entry remains both punishable and continuing grounds for
deportation." Id. at 1047. If by "academic" Justice O'Connor meant "irrelevant," it
now seems perhaps not to be so.
114 See 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2004).
115 Id.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 See United States v. Reulas-Arreguin, 219 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000).
118 Id. (citations omitted)
119 See 468 U.S. at 1056-57.
120 See id.
[Vol. 29
CRIMINALIZING THE UNDOCUMENTED
is not their status that is criminalized, but their prior entry. 2' The
new proposals seek to change that, thereby rendering such persons
in effect permanently criminal simply by virtue of their existence
in the United States.
E. State and Local Enforcement
A major goal of the current proposals seems to be the
empowerment of state and local police to enforce immigration
law. 2 One can easily see the potential benefits of collaboration in
an era of such fears. Indeed, the trend has been developing for
some time.123 The Immigration and Nationality Act was amended
in 1996 to authorize voluntary agreements between the INS and
state and local law enforcement officers.'24 The 1996, INA
§ 103(a)(8), law allowed such state and local officers to be trained
in basic immigration law and then given the authority to arrest and
detain individuals for immigration violations.125
Collaborative enforcement efforts since then have been
episodic, controversial, and highly problematic. In 1997, local
authorities in Chandler, Arizona participated in immigration
round-ups with the Border Patrol. 2 6 Pervasive complaints resulted,
including some from U.S. citizens and at least one local elected
representative.'27 A subsequent investigation by the Arizona
Attorney General found numerous irregularities, and, in 1999, the
121 Id.
122 See Marie Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding
the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO
IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 92 (2002); Refo, supra note 106, American Immigration Lawyers
Association, State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, supra note 107.
123 See Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 939 (1995) (tracking state and local regulation of immigration from the late
19th century to the mid 1990s).
124 See Taylor, supra note 122, at 92 (2002).
125 8 U.S.C. 1103 (a)(8) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2004))
(authorizing state or local law enforcement officers to perform the duties of INS officers
under certain circumstances); INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. 1357 (allowing the Attorney General
to enter into agreements with state or local police department to allow such officers to
perform the duties of INS agents including "the investigation, apprehension, or detention
of aliens in the United States").
126 See Taylor, supra note 122, at 92-93.
127 American Immigration Lawyers Association, State and Local Enforcement of
Federal Immigration Law, supra note 107.
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Chandler City Council approved $400,000.to settle legal claims. 128
In 1998, the Salt Lake City police department allegedly sought
such an agreement but the plan fizzled following deep-seated
resistance. 129  More recently, Florida state law enforcement
officials have reportedly submitted a plan to the Justice
Department to train and then deputize state police officers to work
with the state's Anti-terrorism Task Forces.'3" These officers
would have authority to stop, interrogate, and arrest individuals for
immigration law violations.' 3'
The Department of Justice had until recently long advised that,
"local police should refrain from detaining any person not
suspected of a crime, solely on the ground that they may be
deportable aliens.' 32 A formal DOJ opinion, issued just before the
passage of INA §103(a)(8), stated: "State police lack recognized
legal authority to arrest or detain aliens solely for purposes of civil
immigration proceedings, as opposed to criminal prosecution."'33
Such initiatives have clearly been reinvigorated in the wake of
September 1 1th. In April 2002, reports emerged that the
Department of Justice intended to issue a legal opinion that state
localities had "inherent authority" to enforce all federal
immigration laws, civil or criminal. 134  A firestorm of criticism
resulted, and the opinion has not been publicly released to date.
135
128 Id.
129 See Eric Schmitt, Ruling Clears Way to Use State Police in Immigration Duty,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2002, at A19.
130 Taylor, supra note 122, at 93 (citing August Gribbin, Florida Asks to Arrest
Illegals, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2002, at Al).
131 Id.
132 Linda Reyna Yanez and Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in the
Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1 TEX. HIsp. J.L. & POL'Y 9, 36 (1994) (quoting Press
Release, Att'y Gen. Bell, U.S. Dep't of Justice (June 23, 1978)).
133 Memorandum from Theresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending
Illegal Aliens, for the U.S. Att'y for the S.D. Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopol.ahtm.
134 See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrius G.
Papademetriou (June 24, 2002) (reprinted in 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 964 (Aug. 1,
2002)) ("[T]he Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has concluded that state
and local police have inherent authority to arrest and detain persons who are in violation
of immigration laws .... ). See also Schmitt, supra note 129.
135 State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, AILA ISSUE PAPER
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The Administration has, however, confirmed that the reports
accurately reflect its position on the issue.136 The INS and
Department of Homeland Security have also undertaken
regulatory changes pursuant to INA § 103(a)(8) to facilitate the use
of state and local law enforcement personnel for immigration law
purposes.'37
Two circuits have considered some of the complexities of
state/federal immigration enforcement, albeit long before the
passage of INA § 103(a)(8). Their analyses may shed some light on
the "inherent authority" question and the potential effects of the
CLEAR and HSEA Acts. In 1983, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales
v. City of Peoria,' held that federal law does not preclude the
police from enforcing the criminal provisions of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act. 39 The Ninth Circuit implied, however,
that the pervasive federal civil immigration law enforcement
scheme might preclude the states from civil enforcement. 4 '
No. 211P3005B (American Immigration Lawyers Association, Washington, D.C.), Nov.
25, 2003, available at http://www.aila.org.
136 See id.
137 See Powers of the Attorney General to Authorize State or Local Law
Enforcement Officers To Exercise Federal Immigration Enforcement Authority During a
Mass Influx of Aliens, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,354 (July 24, 2002) (effective Aug. 23, 2002)
(final rule that implements INA 103(a)(8), allowing the Attorney General to authorize
any state or local law enforcement officer to exercise and enforce immigration laws
during the period of a declared "mass influx of aliens"). See also Abbreviation or
Waiver of Training for State or Local Law Enforcement Officers Authorized to Enforce
Immigration Law During a Mass Influx of Aliens, 68 Fed. Reg. 8820 (Feb. 26, 2003)
(interim rule, effective February 26, 2003, to amend the Department of Justice
regulations to authorize the Attorney General to waive normally required training
requirements in the event that the number of state or local law enforcement officers
available to respond in an expeditious manner to urgent and quickly developing events
during a declared mass influx of aliens is insufficient to protect public safety, public
health, or national security).
138 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled in part on other grounds, Hodgers-
Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
139 Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d. 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled in part
on other grounds, Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
140
Although the regulation of immigration is unquestionably an exclusive federal
power, it is clear that this power does not preempt every state activity .... The
City's claim of authority is limited. It asserts only the power to enforce the
criminal provisions of the federal immigration laws. There is nothing inherent in
that specific enforcement activity that conflicts with federal regulatory interests.
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The Court noted that local police are not generally precluded
from enforcing federal criminal statutes.141 One test had been
whether state enforcement activities impaired federal regulatory
interests. 4 2 Where they did not, concurrent enforcement activity is
authorized.'43 Therefore, per the Supreme Court's decision in De
Canas v. Bica,1" federal regulation of a particular field does not
presumptively preempt state enforcement activity "in the absence
of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress
has unmistakably so ordained.' 1
45
The plaintiffs in Gonzalez had contended that the structure of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act evidenced an intent to
preclude local enforcement of the Act's criminal provisions. 146 The
Court disagreed, finding no support for the idea that a "complete
ouster of state power" was "the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."' 47 As to the civil scheme, however, the Court's
conclusions were quite different:
Plaintiffs correctly assert that an intent to preclude local
enforcement may be inferred where the system of federal
regulation is so pervasive that no opportunity for state activity
remains. We assume that the civil provisions of the Act
regulating authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and
deportation, constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as
would be consistent with the exclusive federal power over
Federal and local enforcement have identical purposes - the prevention of the
misdemeanor or felony of illegal entry. The subject matter of the regulation thus
does not require us to find that state enforcement is preempted.
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474.
141 Id. at 474 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v.
DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 474 (citing Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)).
144 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
145 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (quoting Florida Avocado Growers,
373 U.S. at 142).
146 Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled in part
on other grounds, Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
147 Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474 (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357 (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
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immigration.1 48
The Court then expressly distinguished the criminal aspects of
the INA from the civil ones, referring to the criminal provisions as
"a narrow and distinct element of [the broader] immigration
scheme., 149 The criminal provisions were said to be, "few in
number and relatively simple in their terms. 5 ° They are not, and
could not be, supported by a complex administrative structure." 151
The current proposed legislation arguably might change this
calculus. But its explicit affirmation of state and local enforcement
would seem to trump, in any event. 
152
The Tenth Circuit approached the matter differently, holding,
in 1984, in United States v. Salinas-Calderon15 3 that a "[s]tate
trooper has general investigatory authority to inquire into possible
immigration violations.' ' 54  In fact, the Tenth Circuit, in later
cases, has described a "preexisting general authority of State or
local police officers to investigate and make arrests for violations
of federal law, including immigration laws.' 55  Its decisions did
not draw any clear line between criminal violations of the INA and
civil provisions that render an alien deportable, however, and the
analysis of the issues is skimpy. Indeed, Salinas-Calderon was
primarily a Fourth Amendment criminal case that involved the
question whether the officer had probable cause to arrest after
having stopped a car for possible criminal law violations.'56
148 Id. at 474-75.
149 Id. at 475.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108 th Cong. (2003).
153 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984).
154 See United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984).
155 United States v. Vasquez-Alvares, 176 F.3d 1294, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999).
156 Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d at 1300. As to the immigration law issue, the court
merely stated that, "Appellee argues that the state trooper did not have the authority to
detain the passengers while he inquired into federal immigration matters, and further, his
question about the defendant's green card was based on a mere hunch. These arguments
are without merit. A state trooper has general investigatory authority to inquire into
possible immigration violations. Moreover, the trooper's question about the green card
was reasonable under the circumstances, and thus lawful." Id. at 1301 n.3 (10th Cir.
1984). More recently, in United States v. Favela-Favels, 41 Fed. Appx. 185 (10th Cir.
2002), the court cited Salinas-Calderon for the general investigative authority of a state
officer to inquire into possible immigration violations. See also United States v.
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In March 2000, the New York Attorney General reached
similar conclusions to those of the Ninth Circuit.'57 "[T]he INA
does not preempt the authority of state and local officials to make
warrantless arrests for criminal violations of the INA, insofar as
such activity is authorized by state and local law."'58 Regarding
the distinction between civil and criminal enforcement, the New
York Attorney General noted that the INA provides the criminal
penalties of fines and/or imprisonment for violation of some of its
substantive provisions, such as willfully disobeying a removal
order;"' willfully failing to register 160  transporting "illegal
aliens"' 6' engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring undocumented
non-citizens; 16 and illegally entering the country.163 However, the
AG pointed out that the INA also provides that violations of some
provisions are punishable by civil penalties. 1" And, of course,
some violations may result in no sanction other than deportation.
165
Hemandez-Dominguez, 1 Fed. Appx. 827 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that further
detention of a defendant stopped for a traffic violation was justified when defendant
revealed he was an "illegal alien" while police checked his license and registration);
United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Vasquez-Alvares for the proposition that state law enforcement officers "'have the
general authority to investigate and make arrests for violations of federal immigration
laws,' and that federal law as currently written does nothing 'to displace ... state or local
authority to arrest individuals violating federal immigration laws."').
157 Power Under State Law of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers to Make
Arrests for Federal Crimes, 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. No. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000).
158 Id.
159 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
160 8 U.S.C. §1306(a).
161 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a).
162 8 U.S.C. §1324a(f).
163 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
164 Power Under State Law of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers to Make
Arrests for Federal Crimes, 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. No. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (2000) (failure to depart voluntarily after agreeing to do so); §
1253(c) (2000) (penalties relating to vessels and aircraft)).
165 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (defining who is a deportable alien)). The authority
for state and local officers in New York to enforce the INA comes from the state's
Criminal Procedure Law, which permits a warrantless arrest for an "offense." Id.
Offense is defined as conduct punishable by a sentence of imprisonment or a fine. See
Penal Law § 10.00(l) (2003). Thus, the New York AG concluded that "it necessarily
follows that state and local officers have no authority to arrest an individual under the
INA unless the officers have probable cause to believe that the individual has violated
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The New York Attorney General found no authority in the
INA for state law enforcement officers to enforce the civil
provisions of the Act.'66 Although federal law, as noted above,
allows the United States Attorney General to enter an agreement in
emergency situations with a state whereby state officers are
delegated the powers of a federal immigration agent, there is no
such agreement in place in New York. 67
IV. Conclusion
When Attorney General Ashcroft warned "the terrorists
among us" of his zero-tolerance policy he was consciously
echoing statements made by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
to the effect that his Justice Department would arrest a mobster for
"spitting on the sidewalk." Among the many problems with this
rhetorical analogy, however, is the fact that no one in the Kennedy
Administration or since has ever suggested that spitting on the
sidewalk should be a federal crime. Part of the reason for that - the
limitations on federal power to deal with certain types of offenses
- is not applicable to the CLEAR and HSEA Acts, which
criminalize conduct that is already at least subject to federal
control. But the trivialization of federal criminal law is a concern,
as is the increasing usurpation of state and local law enforcement
personnel to serve federal interests. To follow the metaphor
perhaps further than good taste would counsel, the proposed laws
could leave us with fewer undocumented people, but considerably
more spit on our sidewalks.
one of its provisions that calls for a criminal penalty, rather than just a civil penalty or
deportation." 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. No. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000).
166 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. No. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000). In the New York case of
People v. Alvarez, the defendant, an admitted "illegal alien," was arrested by New York
City police detectives. The court held that the defendant's status did not provide the
officers with probable cause to arrest him stating:
In the absence of knowledge of any facts which detail the specific
circumstances by which the defendant .. .became an illegal alien, it is
impossible to find that a felony or even an offense was the basis of the
arrest .... Status as an illegal alien does not per se constitute an offense or a
crime for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or a fine is provided as
defined in [Penal Law § 10.00(1)].
84 Misc. 2d 897, 900 (N.Y. Sup. 1975).
167 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. No. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(8)
(2000) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1 103(a)(10) (2004)).
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 29
More seriously, the number of potential new criminals is
bigger than one might suspect. The U.S. Census Bureau in March
2002 estimated that more than 32.5 million people were foreign-
born. '68 More than 20 million of these foreign-born people were
counted as non-citizens. This number is probably low, however,
due to undercounting of the undocumented population. By the best
estimates, between 7 and 10 million people now live in the United
States without legal status. 169 Also, the contemporary foreign-born
population of the United States is mostly non-European, and
mostly people of color, factors that surely also call into question
proposals seeking to criminalize some 10 million of them and to
allow their arrest by state and local law enforcement personnel. 70
The formally civil deportation system, a most peculiar "pale of
law," has long been in need of major reform. But the CLEAR and
HSEA Acts will create many more problems than they will solve.
168 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 2002, Ethnic and
Hispanic Studies Branch, Population Division, issued February 2003. The report
understates the foreign-born population in at least one regard: it includes as "natives"
persons who were born in "a U.S. island area such as Puerto Rico or born abroad of at
least one parent who was a U.S. citizen." See Dianne Schmidley, "Current Population
Reports, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S.
Census Bureau, February 2003.
169 The INS estimated the number of undocumented persons in this country at 7
million in 2000. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the
United States: 1990-2000, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Policy
and Planning (Jan. 2003), http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/
statistics/lll_Report_1211.pdf. The Pew Hispanic Study Center offered a mid-range
estimate of 7.8 million in 2001. How Many Undocumented: The Numbers Behind the
U.S.-Mexico Migration Talks," Pew Hispanic Center Study (2002), http://www.pew
hispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/studyfrank-bean.pdf. The Urban Institute estimate exceeds 9
million. Urban Institute, "Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures," http://www.
urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8685 (Jan. 14, 2004).
170 Id. at 2.
